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ABSTRACT

The relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is much debated in the literature
on judicial politics. Some studies ﬁnd no relationship between the formal rules governing the structure
of the judiciary and de facto judicial independence, while others ﬁnd a tight correlation. This article sets
out to reassess the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence using a new theory and
an expanded data set. De jure institutional protections, we argue, do not work in isolation but work
conjunctively, so that particular combinations of protections are more likely to be effective than others.
We ﬁnd that rules governing the selection and removal of judges are the only de jure protections that
actually enhance judicial independence in practice and that they work conjunctively. This effect is strongest in authoritarian regimes and in contexts with checks on executive authority.

Judicial independence is everywhere these days, and there seems to be a normative
consensus that it is a good thing. The General Assembly of the United Nations supports
it; the World Bank and other donors spend signiﬁcant funds promoting it; and governments, both democratic and authoritarian, proclaim its existence. Despite all this effort
and normative support, we know relatively little about the makeup and determinants
of judicial independence. Judicial independence, as one of us has put it, has become like
freedom: everyone wants it, but no one knows quite what it looks like or how to get it,
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and it is easiest to observe in its absence ðGinsburg 2010Þ. Most analysts focus on indicia
that judges are dependent on politicians or outside pressures, but it is much more difﬁcult to afﬁrmatively show that judges are independent.
Given the importance placed on judicial independence by the international community, it is perhaps unsurprising that, over the past 25 years, constitutional drafters
have begun to incorporate provisions that insulate the judiciary from external interference. Many countries’ constitutions now contain explicit declarations that the judiciary
is independent, provisions that insulate the tenures and salaries of judges, and limitations
on the roles of the executive and legislative branches in the selection and removal of
judges. Such provisions were relatively rare in constitutions written just 25 years ago.
Before 1985, more than 550 constitutions had been written around the world, and 60%
contained either zero or only one of the six constitutional features that we identify below
as enhancing the independence of the judiciary.1 Since 1985, we have witnessed a spike
in explicit provisions on judicial independence, with two-thirds of constitutions written
thereafter containing two or more such features.
One might expect that such a sharp increase in de jure judicial independence would
be accompanied by an increase in de facto judicial independence. Hayo and Voigt’s ð2007,
2010Þ ﬁndings would certainly support such an expectation. They ﬁnd that, while de
jure judicial independence is not closely related to de facto independence, it is still the
single most important determinant thereof ðHayo and Voigt 2007Þ. Their result provides
direct evidence to corroborate the observation that de jure judicial independence improves de facto human rights protection, a relationship that is presumably mediated by
de facto judicial independence ðsee, e.g., Camp Keith 2002a, 2002b; Camp Keith, Tate,
and Poe 2009Þ.
Despite the results reported by Hayo and Voigt, much of the extant literature is
skeptical of claims that parchment barriers play a causal role in creating independent judiciaries ðLarkin 1996; Smithey and Ishiyama 2002; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Helmke
and Rosenbluth 2009Þ. This skepticism seems warranted by trends in the global development of de jure and de facto judicial independence over the last 35 years. As illustrated in ﬁgure 1, the average level of de facto judicial independence, indicated by
the dashed line, increased sharply between the start of the third wave of democratization in the mid-1970s and the end of the Cold War in 1990. The average level of de
jure judicial independence, indicated by the solid line, started to increase around 1985
and has continued to increase in each year since ðsee also Hayo and Voigt 2013Þ. Thus,
increases in de jure judicial independence lagged behind increases in de facto independence, and increases in the level of de jure judicial independence since 1990 are not
associated with continued increases in the level of de facto judicial independence. This
seems to support those skeptical of any causal relationship running from parchment
1. A description of these six features can be found below in the section entitled “Components of
De Jure Judicial Independence,” where we describe our operationalization of the phenomenon.
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Figure 1. Average levels of de jure and de facto judicial independence from 1960 to 2009.
De jure independence is measured using an additive index of the six features described
in table A1 that are hypothesized to enhance judicial independence. De facto judicial
independence is from Linzer and Staton ð2012Þ.

to practice. At a minimum, the patterns illustrated in ﬁgure 1 suggest that the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is not as simple as the results
reported by Hayo and Voigt suggest.
In this article, we further explore this relationship in order to determine precisely how
and under what conditions de jure independence improves de facto independence. We
use data on de jure judicial independence from the Comparative Constitutions Project
ðCCPÞ and data on de facto judicial independence from Linzer and Staton ð2012Þ. By
identifying which components of de jure law matter for practice, the analysis helps to
reconcile the results reported by Hayo and Voigt ð2007Þ and Camp Keith et al. ð2009Þ
with the common perception that parchment barriers are insufﬁcient to create judicial
independence in practice.
The article is organized as follows. We begin with some conceptual considerations,
providing our deﬁnition of judicial independence and articulating a theory of the association between de jure and de facto judicial independence. Next, we introduce six
aspects of formal constitutions that we expect may enhance judicial independence in
practice, explain how we operationalize those concepts, and provide some data on the
prevalence of those aspects in constitutions written around the world since 1789. We
then turn to the empirical analysis, in which we conduct an original statistical analysis
that focuses on the individual aspects of constitutions we expect to enhance independence.
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We ﬁnd that the only provisions in constitutions that affect de facto judicial independence are those that are likely to be self-enforcing as a result of competition between
the executive and legislative branches. Speciﬁcally, we argue that judicial independence
is enhanced in practice when both the selection and the removal processes for judges
ensure that judges are independent from other political actors. These protections work
conjunctively; one without the other does not produce the desired effects. The effect is
strongest in contexts in which executive authority is checked by other political actors and
in authoritarian regimes. Importantly, this result explains the apparently weak relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Despite
overall increases in de jure judicial independence, few constitutions written over the last
25 years include both selection and removal procedures that enhance judicial independence. Thus, it is unsurprising that better constitutional protection of judicial independence has not generally resulted in more independence in practice, because drafters have not provided the right combination of protections. Our results have important
implications for institutional reform strategies and, more generally, for our understanding of the effectiveness of parchment barriers.
C O N C E P T UA L I Z I N G J U D I C I A L I N D E P E N D E N C E

Judicial independence is a complex and contested concept, but at its core, it involves
the ability and willingness of courts to decide cases in light of the law without undue regard to the views of other government actors. Given all the other qualities that we might
want out of a judiciary, such as consistency, accuracy, predictability, and speedy decision
making, it is not clear that independence is the supreme value we want to maximize. But
it is, nevertheless, an important component in many deﬁnitions of judicial quality, and
a judiciary that repeatedly decides cases in legally implausible ways under the inﬂuence
of government actors is likely to suffer a decline in its reputation for independence and
quality ðVanberg 2005; Staton 2011Þ.
Which Judges?

However conceived, judicial independence can vary across and even within courts in
any particular legal system. A local court may be quite independent of local government
but beholden to senior judges who control promotions ðRamseyer and Rasmusen
2003; see also Ferejohn 1999Þ. A supreme court might be subject to no political inﬂuence or pressure yet be so ideologically in line with government that it never rules
against it in salient cases ðSilverstein 2008Þ. The supreme court may be independent but
local courts corrupt ðas in India, for exampleÞ. In our analysis, we focus on the independence of the highest ordinary court in the jurisdiction.2 This decision is based on both
2. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the supreme court, or its equivalent, in all jurisdictions. We do not look
at constitutional courts, which typically have different mechanisms for appointment and different
terms from the ordinary judiciary ðFerreres Comella 2009Þ. Nor do we look at supranational or
externally located courts, for example, the Privy Council in London or the European Court of

Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?

|

191

theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, the highest ordinary court is typically the
court of last resort, so its independence ðor lack thereof Þ is likely to affect the independence of the entire judiciary ðRamseyer and Rasmusen 2007Þ. Practically, focusing on
the highest ordinary court reduces the aforementioned dimensions of variance to make
the analysis manageable and is standard practice in the existing literature.
The Role of Constitutional Text

Why might constitutional text enhance judicial independence? It is a general challenge
to the empirical study of constitutions to understand exactly when and how formal provisions might make a difference. The general understanding of the literature is that constitutional arrangements are political bargains that are likely to work only when they
are “self-enforcing.” Because there is usually no external actor available to police the
constitutional bargain, parties or institutions must check one another to make the
constitution effective ðWeingast 1997; Ordeshook 1999Þ. Publicly available textual provisions help facilitate such self-enforcement by providing a clear focal point around which
the subjects of the constitution can concentrate their enforcement efforts ðCarey 2000;
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009Þ. But these general intuitions do not speak directly
to judicial independence.
Let us start by acknowledging that judicial independence can be valuable for a variety of reasons. It may allow judges to give force to private law norms, such as contracts,
by ensuring that such norms are not violated ðGilbert 2013Þ. By resolving constitutional ambiguities, judicial independence can also serve to facilitate constitutional selfenforcement by other actors ðLaw 2008Þ. Suppose, for example, that there is a dispute
between the legislature and executive about the scope of executive power in a particular constitutional scheme. Sending the case to a judge who is independent can help
both institutions coordinate their behavior and ensure that their conﬂict does not spiral
out of control ðMcAdams 2005Þ. Thus, judicial independence may have value to many
players to a constitutional bargain.
However valuable, the judiciary is relatively weak among constitutional branches.
Lacking the proverbial pen or the sword, the judiciary ultimately relies on a stock of
political capital among key audiences that can help it to enforce its decisions ðsuch as
the police or executiveÞ or defend it against attack from other actors ðsuch as the general publicÞ. The comparative literature on courts has documented how judges deploy
strategies to help build up their power and reputation among different audiences ðfor
a review of this literature, see Helmke and Rosenbluth ½2009; see also Garoupa and
Ginsburg ½2009 and Staton ½2011Þ.
Constitutional provisions on judicial independence serve to insulate the judiciary
from other actors by reducing the number of weapons at the disposal of the judiciary’s

Justice. These courts are by deﬁnition more independent from political manipulation by nationallevel political actors. See Voigt, Ebeling, and Blume ð2007Þ on the Privy Council.

1 9 2 | J O U R N A L O F L A W A N D C O U R T S | FA L L 2 0 1 4

potential enemies. Constitutional text raises the cost of interfering with judges, in part
because it informs other actors ðe.g., the public, governmental institutions, and other interested audiencesÞ about potential threats to the judiciary. This increases the likelihood
that other actors will coordinate to defend the judiciary’s independence when it is
threatened. In other words, constitutional promises incentivize the production of information on interference with the judiciary, making the promise of judicial independence more credible. In keeping with the general literature on self-enforcement, these
provisions are most likely to be effective in regimes in which there are checks and balances among multiple institutions or in which there is public support for courts.
It should be apparent from this discussion that not all regimes have equal demand
for constitutionally independent judiciaries. Pure dictatorships will have no interest in the
constraints that may be imposed by judicial independence. Electoral authoritarians, however, may wish to empower the judiciary for certain discrete tasks and may enshrine this
into the constitution ðToharia 1975; Moustafa 2007; Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008Þ. We
generally expect that democracies will incorporate a separation of powers that increases
both demand for and the efﬁcacy of constitutional judicial independence. As a result,
there may be fewer constitutional guarantees for judicial independence in soft authoritarian regimes ðElkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014bÞ, but there will be some. These
provisions are likely to be most effective when authoritarian regimes have some internal
division among powerful actors, who may therefore have an interest in impartial adjudication. We thus include all regime types in our analysis, although we examine whether
the relationship between de jure and de facto independence is different in democracies
and autocracies.
Constitutional provisions on judicial independence come in several varieties. Some
specify details about appointment, promotion, and removal of judges. To the extent that
these identify multiple constitutional actors who must be involved, they may become selfenforcing. For example, if a constitution requires the legislature to propose judges for appointment by the president, it seems unlikely that the president would be able to ignore
the legislature because the legislature is likely to retaliate ðby cutting the budget, for exampleÞ. Thus, we expect that text will be more likely to correspond to actual political practice
when it designates multiple bodies to be involved in appointment, promotion, or removal
processes for judges, because each body involved in the process has an incentive to protect
its constitutionally assigned powers.
Other provisions require external actors to enforce them. For example, some 77%
of constitutions in force explicitly state that the judiciary will be independent. This nominal guarantee is unlikely to prevent the executive or the legislature from curtailing
judicial independence if the judiciary makes an unpopular decision. To be effective, nominal provisions need to increase the probability that an external audience will be willing to punish actors that infringe on the principle of judicial independence. Similarly,
some constitutional provisions, such as long terms for judges, protection of judges’
salaries, and prohibition of mandatory retirement ages, require some audience to come
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the defense of judges if violated. Given the coordination problems surrounding enforcement, we expect that enforcement will be more likely for provisions that are more speciﬁc.
This implies that a blanket guarantee of judicial independence, for example, is less likely
to be enforced by external actors than life terms or salary guarantees for judges. A blanket nominal guarantee leaves too much uncertainty about the meaning of judicial independence ðeven scholars cannot agree on how to deﬁne itÞ and may prevent effective
coordination. Institutional protections for salary or term, however, are very clear, increasing the likelihood that actors will agree on the meaning of the provision, be able
to identify violations, and effectively coordinate to punish violators ðWeingast 1997;
Carey 2000Þ.
Judicial independence in constitutions is a bit different from other powers. Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Melton ð2012Þ argue that executive and legislative power depends on the
number of powers assigned to the respective branches. Each additional power granted to
the executive and legislative branches provides either greater agenda control or a greater
ability to punish the other branch. Both of these aspects of political power increase the
range of policies that one branch can pressure the other into approving. Judicial independence provisions do not involve afﬁrmative grants of power so much as institutional
protections that facilitate the exercise of assigned powers.3 Constitutional protection of the
judiciary insulates it from coercion by the other branches of government, enhancing its
autonomy. As a result, any gap in that protection creates an opportunity that the other
branches of government can exploit.
Consider the selection and removal procedures of judges, which are central to conceptions of judicial independence ð Jackson 2007Þ. Imagine a constitution that provides the following procedure for the selection of supreme court justices: ð1Þ a judicial
council presents a list of candidates to the executive, ð2Þ the executive proposes a candidate from that list to the legislature, and ð3Þ the legislature must approve the candidate by a supermajority vote ðsee, e.g., Constitution of the Maldives, art. 142Þ. By involving three discrete institutions to cooperate, such a procedure would seem to reduce
the probability that the justices selected to serve on the supreme court would be biased
toward any particular political actor. Now assume that, in that same constitution, the
procedure to remove justices is dominated by the legislature.4 In this ﬁctitious constitution, even though the justices selected for the supreme court are fairly independent
at the moment they are appointed, they will be forced to keep the legislature happy to
remain in ofﬁce.
Unlike the theory of executive and legislative power presented by Elkins et al. ð2012Þ
or the implicit theories adopted by the literature on judicial independence ðCamp Keith
3. Assigned powers are better conceived of as deﬁning the scope of judicial decision making than
enhancing independence per se.
4. For example, the 1986 constitution of the Philippines provides that one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives can initiate impeachment proceedings, which then take place in the
legislature.
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et al. 2009; Abbasi 2013Þ, our theory of judicial independence is not additive. Simply
adding more de jure protection is unlikely to increase judicial independence in practice
because those who wish to interfere with courts need only ﬁnd one hole in the judicial
armor. Instead of treating each aspect of de jure protection as contributing equally to de
facto judicial independence, we expect that multiple aspects of de jure judicial independence must be combined for that protection to be effective. Combining selection and
removal procedures that involve multiple actors seems particularly likely to enhance de
facto judicial independence. These aspects of de jure protection allow the selection of independent judges who will not fear arbitrary removal from ofﬁce and are most likely
to be self-enforcing.
There is, of course, nothing determinative about text. There is no guarantee that
textual provisions will be observed or that they will facilitate coordination. Indeed, existing scholarship has found an increasing gap between constitutional text and constitutional practice as the documents matured over time ðElkins et al. 2009, 30Þ. Our argument here is probabilistic. Ceteris paribus, textual promises will facilitate enforcement
to the extent that they raise the visibility of judicial independence or designate multiple
ofﬁcials to be involved in institutional processes related to the judiciary. Our theory
suggests that such provisions are most effective under two conditions: ð1Þ when they
are combined with other provisions that insulate the judiciary from external interference and ð2Þ when there are checks and balances. Ideally, a judiciary would be insulated
by multiple layers of de jure protection and reside in a system with at least some veto
players. However, as we demonstrate below, such an environment is quite rare.
It is worth clarifying that our account does not try to specify a complete causal theory.
In designing constitutions, policy makers have a number of alternative instruments at
their disposal to accomplish any particular goal. The judicial independence “solution” is
likely to be particularly attractive when the judiciary is already a credible actor. As a result,
we might observe constitutionalization of de jure independence after increases in de facto
independence. It would not be surprising to ﬁnd a reciprocal relationship between de
jure and de facto independence. Our concern is to measure the correlation between the
two concepts, as a ﬁrst step toward building a full causal account.
We should also clarify the theoretical alternatives to our argument that text matters under some conditions. One view of constitutional text suggests that it is driven by
diffusion across time and space, so that constitution makers copy and borrow ðElkins
2010; Law and Versteeg 2010Þ. This account would suggest that the spread of provisions on judicial independence would be driven by emulation or learning, rather than
by local political factors. The theory does not, however, provide any account of the
relationship between text and practice and, indeed, implies that there may be only a
weak relation.
Another possibility is that some unobserved factor may be causing any correlation
that we ﬁnd between de jure and de facto judicial independence. For instance, deference
toward the judiciary may be a societal norm, which prompts constitutional drafters to
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create strong protection for the judiciary’s independence and politicians to respect the
judiciary’s independence in practice. We cannot rule out this possibility in the analysis
below, but our emphasis on the speciﬁc mechanisms of appointment and removal suggests that there is something about these particular attributes of de jure judicial independence. If a third factor was causing both stronger formal protections and de facto
independence, one might expect that all of the formal protections that we identify would
be equally correlated with practice.
COMPONENTS OF DE JURE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

There are a number of studies that specify which aspects of constitutions should enhance judicial independence ðHayo and Voigt 2007; Camp Keith et al. 2009; RiosFigueroa 2011Þ. We draw on these studies to identify six aspects of constitutions that
enhance judicial independence and autonomy. In keeping with our theory, the emphasis
is on components that will insulate the judiciary from attacks by other political actors,
and with the exception of the ﬁrst aspect, we try to focus on provisions that either raise
the visibility of judicial independence or designate multiple ofﬁcials to be involved in institutional processes related to the judiciary.

1. Statement of Judicial Independence. Our ﬁrst criterion is simply nominal:
we ask whether the constitution contains an explicit declaration regarding the
independence of the central judicial organ. This is the variable analyzed in
Hayo and Voigt ð2010Þ. Recall that we are skeptical about the effect such a
declaration will have on judicial independence in practice.
2. Judicial Tenure. The founders of the US Constitution felt that they needed
to give judges lifetime appointments to enhance independence. In some
countries, however, supreme court judges are subject to limited terms that
vary from 1 year ðe.g., Syria’s constitution of 1930Þ to 15 years ðe.g., Mexico
after 1994Þ. Hayo and Voigt ð2007Þ code judges with limited tenure as having
more independence if they are only allowed one term, on the theory that
judges with single terms will be less beholden to politicians involved in
reappointment. Rios-Figueroa ð2011Þ argues that the key factor is whether
the term length of judges is longer than the term of those who appoint them.
Our approach is stricter than either of these: we expect tenure to enhance
judicial independence only if it is for the life of the judge.5 While this might
seem to be a strict criterion, most countries with life tenure have a mandatory
retirement age, so in practice, judges can have terms shorter than those
produced in systems that stipulate long terms. Even so, a life guarantee means
that judges will not necessarily be looking for another job after retirement,
5. A total of 111 of the 726 ð∼15%Þ constitutions for which we have data specify a life term for
judges.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

which should enhance independence. The rationale for a relationship between
other limited term lengths and de facto judicial independence is less clear.
Selection Procedure. To be able to issue independent decisions, the judiciary
must be sufﬁciently insulated from political pressures to decide cases. The
procedures for judicial appointment and removal go to this set of issues. For the
appointment process to the highest court, we look at the bodies that nominate
and approve appointments. We consider appointment processes that involve a
judicial council or two ðor moreÞ actors as enhancing judicial independence.6
Removal Procedure. Even if judges are independently appointed, they will
not be independent if they are under constant threat of being removed
from ofﬁce. For the removal procedure, we focus on whether the constitution
regulates judicial removal and, if so, who proposes removal. The judiciary
should be more independent if judges cannot be removed, if removal requires
the proposal of a supermajority vote in the legislature, or if only the public or
judicial council can propose removal and another political actor is required
to approve such a proposal.
Limited Removal Conditions. Beyond the removal procedure, we believe that
the conditions under which judges can be removed affect judicial independence. If the constitution explicitly limits removal to crimes and other issues of
misconduct, treason, or violations of the constitution, we expect the judiciary
to be more independent.
Salary Insulation. It is usually assumed that judges will be more independent
if their salaries are protected from reduction. The logic is that political actors
might seek to punish judges by reducing their salaries in response to adverse
decisions. Many constitutions thus prohibit reductions in salary, and we
suspect that this prohibition creates more independent judiciaries.

To measure these six aspects of de jure judicial independence, we use data from the CCP,
a project that aims to catalog the contents of all constitutions written around the world
since 1789 ðElkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014aÞ.7 For each aspect, we create a binary variable, which is coded one when that aspect of the constitution is expected to enhance judicial
independence in practice and zero otherwise. We expect to observe a positive relationship
between these de jure indicators and de facto judicial independence in the analysis below.
6. To be sure, there is the possibility that multiple institutions might only be able to agree on very
weak judicial candidates or may develop conventions ðsuch as that for appointments to the German
Constitutional CourtÞ that allocate appointments to particular political parties, in which case
individual judges may still be dependent. Still, as a general matter we believe that multi-institution
processes tend to produce candidates at least as independent as those produced when a single body
controls appointments.
7. The speciﬁc variables and coding rules used to operationalize these aspects of constitutions are
provided in table A1 of the appendix.
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Before we turn to this analysis, though, let us brieﬂy describe the distribution of de
jure protection of judicial independence. Our analysis includes all constitutions in the
CCP data set through 2009. We already noted that most constitutions written after 1985
contain at least two of the six features that we expect to enhance judicial independence in practice. However, few constitutions written between 1985 and 2009 ðonly
2%Þ included all six protections, with the vast majority ð85%Þ protecting between one
and four of the features we identiﬁed as theoretically important. As for the particular
features protected, ﬁgure 2 illustrates the proportion of newly promulgated constitutions
that protect each of the six aspects of de jure judicial independence from 1850 to 2009.
Most of the growth in de jure judicial independence over the last 25 years came from
increases in the number of constitutions with explicit statements of judicial indepen-

Figure 2. Aspects of de jure judicial independence in new constitutions ð1850–2009Þ
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dence. This is the aspect of de jure judicial independence that we expect will be the least
effective because it lacks any afﬁliated institutional structure. Selection procedures that
enhance judicial independence have also increased in popularity over time. All other aspects of constitutions that we associate with judicial independence were relatively stable
over the time period analyzed in ﬁgure 2 and were absent in most constitutions in force
circa 2009.
Of the constitutions in force in 2009, the only aspect of de jure judicial independence found in a majority of texts was a formal declaration of judicial independence. For
the other aspects of de jure protection, most constitutions were silent. The term length
for judges was not speciﬁed in 58% of constitutions, no removal procedure was provided
in 58% of constitutions, and there was no mention of salary protection in 83% of constitutions. The exception was the selection procedure. While some selection procedure
was speciﬁed in 70% of constitutions, most of these did not include multiple actors or a
judicial council, the procedures expected to enhance judicial independence.
Poor de jure protection of judicial independence is worrisome. Any gaps in de jure
protection provide an opportunity for executive and legislative actors to inﬂuence the
judiciary, but few constitutions provide comprehensive de jure protection. Only three
constitutions ðtwo of these were in force in 2009Þ protected all six of the aspects of
de jure judicial independence, and only 30 ð16 in force in 2009Þ protected ﬁve of the
six aspects of de jure judicial independence. The vast majority of constitutions ð76%
overall and 54% of constitutions in force in 2009Þ protected fewer than three of the
six aspects. These gaps provide mechanisms for government actors to inﬂuence the
judiciary, creating the possibility that whatever de jure protection was actually in place
will be ineffective. Although there has been some improvement in de jure protection of
judicial independence over the last 25 years, the vast majority of constitutions still lack
the comprehensive protection that we suspect is necessary ðalthough not sufﬁcientÞ to
create an independent judiciary in practice.
RESEARCH DESIGN

We now turn to our analysis of the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial
independence. We test the hypotheses elaborated above using data from 192 countries
spanning from 1960 to 2008. In the analysis, we focus on between-country variance because both de jure and de facto judicial independence are relatively stable within countries over time ðHayo and Voigt 2007; Linzer and Staton 2012Þ. As a result, models that
focus on within-country variance will have low power, and the power of our analysis is already quite limited by the fact that most of the components of de jure judicial
independence are only present in a handful of countries. Thus, for each speciﬁcation, we
estimate two regression models. The ﬁrst model is cross-sectional, using the data available from 2008, and is estimated via ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ. The second model
is time series cross-sectional and is estimated using a population-averaged estimator.
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Since population-averaged estimators are particularly sensitive to missing data, the
estimates from the population-averaged models are based on the combined results from
10 data sets imputed using Amelia II ðHonaker, King, and Blackwell 2009; Honaker
and King 2010Þ.
Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for all models is a new measure of de facto judicial independence developed by Linzer and Staton ð2012Þ. They use a multirater measurement
model to combine eight extant measures of de facto judicial independence into a single
measure. The resulting measure is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1.
For the most part, the extant measures used in Linzer and Staton’s measurement
model are well accepted, relying on information drawn from the US State Department
Human Rights Country Reports or from expert surveys ðsee the measures by Feld and
Voigt ½2003; Howard and Carey ½2004; Tate and Camp Keith ½2009; Cingranelli and
Richards ½2010Þ. However, some measures included in Linzer and Staton’s ð2012Þ index have a more attenuated relationship with judicial independence, like contract intensive money ðClague et al. 1999Þ and the executive constraints subcomponent of
the Polity index ðMarshall and Jaggers 2010Þ. Although these measures are often used
as proxies for judicial independence, they were not created for that purpose and clearly
tap multiple concepts. That said, all of the measures used by Linzer and Staton ð2012Þ
are highly correlated, suggesting a high level of convergent validity ðRios-Figueroa and
Staton 2011Þ.
While the Linzer and Staton ð2012Þ measure is not perfect, measures of latent concepts never are. Most importantly, concerns arise from their use of component measures that have questionable validity. Invalid component measures, such as the controversial measures mentioned above, might lead to biased estimates of de facto judicial
independence. We say “might” because this is not guaranteed. The model will interpret
a single invalid measure as unreliable and decrease the weight given to that indicator
when estimating judicial independence. Thus, one would have to introduce multiple
invalid measures, which are all biased in the same direction, to bias the estimates of
judicial independence from Linzer and Staton’s model. Anything less will increase uncertainty in the estimates but not bias them.
In our view, the beneﬁts of using Linzer and Staton’s measure far outweigh the risks.
The measurement theory underlying the model gives us signiﬁcant conﬁdence in both
the validity and the reliability of the resulting measure. In fact, assuming all of the component measures are valid, the multirater measurement model employed by Linzer and
Staton ð2012Þ guarantees not only that the measure will be valid but that it will also be
at least as reliable as any component measure in each country-year. Given that the only
real threat posed by the measure would result from the use of multiple invalid extant
measures, we believe that it is the best and safest measure available to us.
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Independent Variables

The main independent variables in our models are the measures of de jure judicial
independence elaborated in the previous section. In addition, we include a number of
covariates that are commonly thought to increase de facto judicial independence. These
covariates include all of the variables used by Hayo and Voigt ð2007Þ as well as a number of additional variables that we suspect affect independence in practice. Speciﬁcally,
we include variables representing the number of veto points, or checks, in the political
system; the level of democracy; press freedom and the number of nongovernmental organizations, which should help facilitate coordination to defend the judiciary; economic
development; population size; religious composition; legal origin; the promulgation year
of the constitution; and region ﬁxed effects. Of these variables, the only one not standard in statistical models of judicial independence is the promulgation year of the constitution, which we include as a proxy for institutional stability. Descriptions of these
variables are available in table 1, and summary statistics for each variable are available
in table 2.
T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P B E T W E E N D E J U R E A N D D E FA C T O
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

The regression results are presented in ﬁgures 3–5.8 Figure 3 presents the results of a
regression model estimated with control variables, using a population-averaged estimator.
The ﬁgure illustrates the effect of several variables on de facto judicial independence. The
marker associated with each variable is the point estimate from a population-averaged
model, and the bar surrounding the point is the 95% conﬁdence interval. A variable is
considered statistically signiﬁcant when the 95% conﬁdence interval does not overlap
the reference line.
Looking ﬁrst at the covariates in the ﬁgure, several are statistically and substantively
signiﬁcant. The level of democracy, press freedom, and economic performance all have
positive and statistically signiﬁcant effects on de facto judicial independence. As one might
expect, democracy has one of the largest effects. On the basis of the estimates in model 8,
a country with a level of democracy of 1 is expected to score about 0.11 higher on de
facto judicial independence than a country with a score of 0. In other words, countries
like Iran and North Korea that have the lowest levels of democracy score, on average,
0.11 points lower on Linzer and Staton’s measure than Scandinavian countries, which
have the highest levels of democracy.
Press Freedom and gross domestic product ðGDPÞ also have consistently large, positive effects on de facto judicial independence. The results from model 8 suggest that a
one-unit increase in GDP leads to about a 0.05 unit increase in de facto judicial independence. The effect of GDP is interesting because it is present after controlling for
the level of democracy, which means that rich authoritarian regimes may be more likely
8. Full regression results are presented in tables A2–A4 of the appendix.

Table 1. Description of Covariates Used in the Empirical Analysis
Variable

Description

Source

Number checks on executive authority,
averaged from 1997 to 2007; rescaled
by subtracting the number of checks by one
Democracy
Binary variable indicating observations with a score
greater than 0.16 on the graded democracy measure
Press Freedom
Level of press freedom, averaged from 1997 to 2007
GDP ðlnÞ
Log of gross domestic product per capita, averaged
from 1997 to 2007
Population ðlnÞ
Log of the population, averaged from 1997 to 2007
Interstate NGOs
Number of nongovernmental organizations,
averaged from 1997 to 2007
Christian ð%Þ
Percentage of the population that is Christian
Muslim ð%Þ
Percentage of the population that is Muslim
Common Law
Binary variable coded 1 if the country has a common
law legal tradition
Promulgation Year Year in which the in-force constitution was
promulgated
Checks

Beck et al. ð2001Þ

Pemstein, Meserve,
and Melton ð2010Þ
Freedom House ð2010Þ
Heston, Summers, and
Aten ð2009Þ
Heston et al. ð2009Þ
Hafner-Burton and
Tsutsui ð2005Þ
ARDA ð2005Þ
ARDA ð2005Þ
JuriGlobe ð2010Þ
Elkins et al. ð2014aÞ

Table 2. Summary Statistics
2008
Mean
Dependent variable:
D. F. Judicial Independence
De jure variable:
Selection Proc.
Removal Proc.
Sel. & Rem. Proc.
Life Term
Removal Cond.
Salary Insulation
Statement of JI
Covariate:
Checks
Democracy
Press Freedom
GDP ðlnÞ
Population ðlnÞ
Interstate NGOs
Christian ð%Þ
Muslim ð%Þ
Common Law
Promulgation Year

SD

1960–2008
Observations

Mean

SD

Observations

.51

.30

189

.45

.31

7,911

.53
.18
.11
.25
.42
.28
.77

.50
.39
.31
.44
.49
.45
.42

191
191
191
191
191
191
191

.36
.13
.07
.20
.36
.25
.68

.48
.33
.25
.40
.48
.43
.47

7,259
7,259
7,259
7,259
7,259
7,259
7,259

2.86
.60
.60
2.15
8.62
742.96
.57
.23
.35
1977

1.46
.49
.23
.14
2.02
781.07
.38
.35
.48
34

173
191
191
184
184
187
191
191
191
189

2.46
.44
2.04
8.46
8.53
528.77
.56
.24
.35
1962

1.71
.50
.85
1.13
1.95
604.16
.38
.35
.48
36

5,333
7,975
4,984
7,110
7,491
4,012
7,960
7,960
7,960
7,670
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Figure 3. Determinants of de facto judicial independence. Estimates are from model 4
of table A2. They are estimated using a population-averaged model. Dependent variable
is Linzer and Staton’s ð2012Þ measure of judicial independence, which is continuous and
ranges from 0 to 1. Promulgation year and region fixed effects are omitted.

to protect judicial independence in practice. The effect of press freedom is also interesting. According to model 8, a shift from one end of the press freedom scale to the other
ðfrom a score of 21 to 1Þ is expected to increase de facto judicial independence by about
0.14. Not only is this a relatively large effect, but it is consistent with research arguing that public support for the judiciary is critical for its independence ðVanberg 2005;
Staton 2011Þ.
Aside from these important time-variant variables, there are also a number of timeinvariant variables that seem to affect de facto judicial independence. States with a large
Muslim population are less likely to have an independent judiciary. Moving from a state
with no Muslims to one that is completely Muslim is expected to decrease de facto judicial independence by about 0.08. Common law countries are expected to score about
0.08 higher on Linzer and Staton’s judicial independence measure than are civil law
countries. Importantly, the effects of the aforementioned covariates are relatively stable
across the models we have estimated. Some of the other covariates are also statistically
signiﬁcant in some model speciﬁcations, but their effects are either inconsistent ðe.g.,
population and the number of nongovernmental organizationsÞ or small ðe.g., checksÞ.
Figure 3 tests the independent effect of all six aspects of de jure judicial independence.
None of the de jure judicial independence variables are statistically signiﬁcant in ﬁgure 3.
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Note, though, that there are some speciﬁcations in which one ðor moreÞ of these six
variables is statistically signiﬁcant. For instance, several of these variables become statistically signiﬁcant when the covariates are removed from the model ðsee models 1 and 3
in table A2Þ. Statements of judicial independence have a large and statistically signiﬁcant
effect on de facto judicial independence when there are no covariates in the model,
although the direction of the effect is not consistent across models. In addition, when
there are no covariates in the model, constitutions that provide for a selection procedure
that insulates the judiciary or that insulate the judiciary’s salary from external interference
signiﬁcantly increase the level of de facto judicial independence.
However, as one can see from ﬁgure 3, when covariates are included, the effects of
these de jure attributes disappear. This is almost certainly because many of the covariates
are correlated with the attributes that we associate with de jure judicial independence.
For instance, our results show that democracy is positively correlated with de facto judicial independence, and prior research suggests that it is also positively correlated with de
jure judicial independence ðElkins et al. 2014bÞ.9 As a result, we have more faith in the
estimates from ﬁgure 3 than other models we have estimated, included in the appendix.
Thus, consistent with the theory elaborated above, we ﬁnd that none of the de jure attributes have an independent and statistically signiﬁcant effect on de facto judicial independence when control variables are included.
We next assessed the effect of different combinations of de jure judicial independence attributes on de facto judicial independence. To do so, we created binary variables to represent the four possible combinations of the selection and removal procedure variables: ð1Þ neither is present in the constitution, ð2Þ both are present, ð3Þ only
the selection variable is included, and ð4Þ only the removal procedure is included. The
results of these models are illustrated in ﬁgure 4, which estimates the effect that each of
these possibilities has on de facto judicial independence. Note that the reference category in the models underlying ﬁgure 4 is the ﬁrst combination listed above: constitutions
without either a selection or a removal procedure expected to enhance judicial independence. Thus, the estimates represent the difference in de facto judicial independence
between the reference category and the speciﬁed attribute or combination of attributes.
None of the variables are statistically signiﬁcant in the top plot of ﬁgure 4. Recall
that we hypothesized that countries with both selection and removal procedures that enhanced judicial independence in their constitution would have higher levels of de facto
judicial independence. Although the effect of having both selection and removal procedures that enhance judicial independence is statistically signiﬁcant in some models
we have estimated, the effect disappears in the populated-averaged model represented in
ﬁgure 4. This suggests that, across our entire sample, there is only moderate support for
9. There is some evidence for this conjecture in table A3. After stratifying the sample by regime
type, the magnitude of the coefﬁcient estimates between the models with and without covariates
becomes much more stable.

Figure 4. Effect of de jure judicial selection and removal process. Estimates are from
model 8 of table A2 and models 12 and 16 of table A3. They are estimated using a
population-averaged model. Dependent variable is Linzer and Staton’s ð2012Þ measure of
judicial independence, which is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1. Covariates are omitted.
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our hypothesis that combining different attributes of de jure judicial independence will
enhance independence in practice.
The Moderating Effect of Regime Type

Previous research suggests that regime-type affects the likelihood of observing de jure
judicial independence ðElkins et al. 2014bÞ, as well as the particular motives of those who
do adopt it ðMoustafa and Ginsburg 2008Þ. This leads to our expectation, speciﬁed
above, that the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence might
vary by regime type. To test this hypothesis, we reestimated the model from the top
panel of ﬁgure 4, stratifying the sample by regime type. The middle panel of ﬁgure 4
represents a model that only uses observations coded as authoritarian, and the bottom
panel of ﬁgure 4 represents a model that only uses observations coded as democratic.
The estimates from the bottom two panels of ﬁgure 4 suggest that authoritarian
countries with selection and removal procedures that enhance the autonomy of the
judiciary have levels of de facto judicial independence around 0.07 higher ð95% conﬁdence interval 5 0.02–0.13Þ than authoritarian countries that lack both of these attributes.10 This is relatively large effect, about one-half of a standard deviation. Notably,
the magnitude of the effect is as large as any of the covariates ðnot shownÞ that are included in the model. Only the common law variable is as large, at 0.06. The next closest
is press freedom, which is about half the size at 0.04. ðNote that a maximum shift in the
level of press freedom, from 21 to 1, would yield an increase in de facto judicial independence of 0.08.Þ It seems that, at least in authoritarian countries, Hayo and Voigt’s
ð2007Þ suggestion that de jure judicial independence is the most important predictor of
de facto judicial independence may be true, but only for this speciﬁc combination of de
jure attributes. The same cannot be said for democratic countries. On the basis of the
estimates illustrated in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 4, there appears to be no relationship
between de jure and de facto judicial independence in democracies, perhaps because electoral constraints or other institutions prevent gross manipulation of the judiciary.
The effect found in ﬁgure 4 is probably surprising to some. Not only is there a fair
amount of skepticism about judicial independence in authoritarian regimes, but there is
equal ðif not greaterÞ skepticism about the effectiveness of parchment barriers. However,
we believe the result is perfectly consistent with the developing literature on authoritarian
institutions. An electoral authoritarian, in particular, might want to have courts that are
independent over a certain set of cases, such as those involving the economy. But this
10. As a robustness check, we estimated the underlying model using every possible two-way
combination of the six components of de jure judicial independence. The purpose of this is to check
whether there are other combinations of these components that have a consistent, statistically
signiﬁcant effect on de facto judicial independence in either democratic or authoritarian regimes. Out
of the 60 models estimated, no individual component is consistently statistically signiﬁcant in either
regime type. The only two components that can be combined to have a robust effect on de facto
judicial independence are the selection and removal procedure variables.
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does not mean that the electoral authoritarian wants to give up all control. In particular,
if the leader has sufﬁcient political power to control multiple branches of government,
she might not be troubled by constraints on the appointment of judges. A requirement
that judges be selected by multiple institutions under the leader’s indirect control might
still produce a judiciary that is likely to avoid interfering with core issues of importance to
the regime. Once they are in place, however, we sometimes observe judges deviating from
these constraints ðMoustafa 2007Þ. Protection from removal might make judges more
likely to deviate from the preferences of political leaders, since early removals are likely to
be observed by both the public and opposition factions, raising costs for government.
The Moderating Effect of Checks and Balances

Our ﬁnal hypothesis is that de jure judicial independence will be more effective in systems with checks on executive authority. This hypothesis is important to test, given our
ﬁnding about the importance of the selection and removal procedures for judges. Even
if the procedures involve multiple actors at a formal level, it is possible that one party ðor
interest groupÞ might hold all of the positions of power in a system, in which case, the de
jure protections established by the constitution could be easily circumvented. The party
could undermine the independence of the judiciary while following the constitutionally
prescribed procedures, or depending on the constitutional amendment procedure, it could
amend the constitution to establish procedures that give it more inﬂuence over the
judiciary.
To test this hypothesis, we reestimated several models similar to those reported in
ﬁgure 4 and included an interaction between the number of checks and balances ðas
measured by Beck et al. ½2001Þ and a variable indicating countries that combine selection and removal procedures that enhance independence. The results from these models
are presented in ﬁgure 5.11 The solid line indicates the marginal effect of the index as the
number of checks on executive authority increases, and the two dashed lines illustrate
the 95% conﬁdence interval around that effect. As predicted, de jure protection of judicial independence has a stronger effect on de facto judicial independence in countries
with checks on executive authority. Regardless of regime type, the effect of having both
a selection and a removal process that enhances independence increases as the number
of checks on executive authority increases. However, similar to the results reported in ﬁgure 4, the effect is only statistically signiﬁcant in authoritarian regimes. In such regimes,
the effect becomes statistically signiﬁcant when there are one or two veto players who
can check the authority of the executive. Selection and removal procedures that enhance

11. The estimates from the models underlying ﬁg. 5 are provided in the appendix. Note that we
removed the constituent terms of the interaction between the selection and removal procedure from
these models to save degrees of freedom. We think this is justiﬁed because the constituent terms have no
consistent, statistically signiﬁcant effect on de facto judicial independence across the models in table A3.

Figure 5. Effect of de jure judicial selection and removal process by number of checks.
Estimates are from models 3 and 4 of table A4. Dependent variable is Linzer and Staton’s
ð2012Þ measure of judicial independence, which is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1.
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judicial independence are expected to increase judicial independence in practice by about
0.07 when there is one veto player and about 0.09 when there are two.12
The effect of selection and removal procedures that enhance judicial independence
becomes statistically insigniﬁcant when there are more than two veto players, but this
is most likely due to the fact that few authoritarian regimes have such high numbers of
veto players, and those that do only rarely have the critical combination of selection and
removal procedures that enhance judicial independence. In fact, in authoritarian regimes,
as the number of checks increases, the number of countries with such a combination of
de jure attributes in their constitution drops precipitously. We only observe the relevant
combination in 84 country-years when there are zero checks, in 56 country-years when
there are one or two checks, and in 9 country-years when there are three or more checks.
These numbers are important in two respects. First, they suggest that the results in ﬁgure 5 are based on only a few country-years, which limits their generalizability. Second,
they suggest the possibility, which we do not explore here, that authoritarian regimes may
be strategic in their entrenchment of selection and removal procedures that enhance
judicial autonomy, since they seem to be more likely to do so when there are no veto
players to prevent them from manipulating those procedures.
Looking at the panel for democratic regimes, the marginal effect of de jure judicial
independence is increasing in the number of checks and balances, but the 95% conﬁdence interval overlaps the reference line regardless of the level of checks and balances,
indicating that the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant. One explanation for this ﬁnding is
that the democratic countries with the highest levels of de facto judicial independence
tend to be the countries with older constitutions, which tend to have weaker de jure
protection of judicial independence. Thus, the null results presented in ﬁgure 5 might
be caused by the fact that older democracies have found alternative mechanisms of
guaranteeing de facto judicial independence. This in turn suggests that we might ﬁnd the
hypothesized relationship if we restrict our analysis to newly democratized countries.13

12. The conﬁdence intervals illustrated in ﬁg. 5 might be slightly narrower than they should be
because the model on which they are based implicitly compares many groups. As a result, the standard
errors on which the conﬁdence intervals are based may be artiﬁcially low. To check this possibility,
we performed a Wald test to assess the likelihood that both the de jure judicial independence term
and the interaction term are equal to zero ðEsarey and Lawrence 2012Þ. The F-statistic for the top panel
of ﬁg. 5 is 3.06 ð pðF 5 0Þ 5 .048Þ. Thus, at conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance ði.e., a 5 .05Þ,
we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient estimates for both of those variables are zero in
the population-averaged model using observations from authoritarian regimes.
13. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. In the data, there are
20 countries that are coded as continuously democratic from 1960 to 2008, and, despite the fact that
not a single country has the combination of selection and removal procedures that we argue enhances de
facto judicial independence, their median score on Linzer and Staton’s index is 0.94. The median
score for democracies that experienced a transition from 1960 to 2008 is 0.56.
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Restricting the analysis to only those democracies that experienced one or more
regime transitions from 1960 to 2008 does slightly change the results.14 In this set of
countries, when the number of veto players is ﬁve or greater, the marginal effect of selection and removal procedures that enhance judicial independence in practice is statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level. Thus, there is some evidence that selection and removal procedures designed to enhance de facto judicial independence are effective in
transitional democracies.
To summarize the statistical analysis, our results conﬁrm neither the estimates presented in Hayo and Voigt ð2007Þ nor the views of those skeptical of the role that parchment plays in creating an independent judiciary. We ﬁnd that de jure judicial independence is correlated with de facto judicial independence, but the effect is limited to those
provisions that are self-enforcing as a result of competition between the executive and
legislative branches. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that constitutions with processes that involve
multiple bodies in the selection and removal of judges are associated with higher levels of
judicial independence. This ﬁnding is restricted to contexts with checks on the authority of the executive and in authoritarian regimes.
C O N C LU S I O N

The literature on the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is
still very small and, in many ways, has proceeded without a theory of why text might make
a difference in practice. Drawing on the literature on self-enforcing constitutions, we expect
that de jure protections that rely on multiple constitutional actors to check one another
will be more effective than those that lack obvious mechanisms for self-enforcement.
Our theory allows us to differentiate among various de jure protections of independence. Because clever politicians can exploit the absence of any single de jure protection
for judicial independence, we argue that protections ought to work in tandem with one
another, so that their impact is likely to be conjunctive rather than additive.
Our analysis draws on new data from the CCP to examine the relationship between
de jure and de facto independence. We compared the CCP data on de jure independence
with the increasingly inﬂuential new measure of de facto independence by Linzer and
Staton. We ﬁnd support for our hypotheses, and in particular, we show that rules governing the selection and removal of judges are the most important protections for judicial independence. The effect of selection and removal procedures that enhance judicial
independence is most pronounced in authoritarian regimes with checks and balances.
We observe little ðif anyÞ effect in democratic regimes but ﬁnd some evidence for the
effect in new democracies.

14. Results from this analysis are available from the authors on request.
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This result helps us understand why, over the last 25 years, increases in de jure protection of judicial independence have not been followed by similar increases in de facto
judicial independence. The most effective components of de jure judicial independence,
those related to the selection and removal of judges, are still relatively rare in contemporary constitutions. Only 11% of constitutions in force in 2009 contained selection
and removal procedures that protected the judiciary from interference by the other
branches of government.
The results reported here also help us understand the tension in the existing literature.
The positive relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence reported by
Hayo and Voigt ð2007Þ is largely driven by their use of an additive index, which masks
heterogeneity in the effectiveness of different aspects of de jure judicial independence.
The lack of a relationship found by other scholars is perhaps the result of case selection,
given how rarely constitutions entrench effective de jure protection of judicial independence. For instance, two recent empirical studies ﬁnd no relationship between de jure and
de facto judicial independence in postcommunist countries ðSmithey and Ishiyama 2002;
Herron and Randazzo 2003Þ. However, few postcommunist constitutions establish protections for both selecting and removing judges, and, importantly, none of the cases analyzed by the aforementioned studies had such protection.
Our ﬁndings in this study have important practical implications. A broad consensus
has emerged over the last 20 years that an independent judiciary is desirable. However,
moving from a desire for judicial independence to effective practice has proven to be a
challenge that has been exacerbated by contradictory ﬁndings in prior studies about the
role of formal institutions in creating an independent judiciary. Our results clarify which
aspects of de jure judicial independence enhance judicial independence in practice and
identify the conditions under which de jure protection is most effective. Our results suggest that de facto judicial independence might be improved if countries adopt both
selection and removal procedures that insulate judges from the other branches of
government.
The results reported here also have implications for understanding the effectiveness
of constitutions as so-called parchment barriers. Our results suggest that certain constitutional provisions are associated with judicial independence in practice, and this is an
interesting result all on its own. It is even more interesting when one considers that an
independent judiciary is often given the responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the
constitution. Thus, a logical hypothesis one could derive from our results is that there
may be better compliance with constitutional provisions unrelated to the judiciary
ðsuch as constitutional rightsÞ in constitutions with the speciﬁed judicial selection and
removal procedures than in countries without such protections. The idea that effective
de jure protection of the judiciary can enhance overall compliance with the constitution
is an intriguing possibility that is worth testing in future research. Finding such a relationship would suggest that constitutional drafters have some power over whether their
products are merely parchment barriers or something more.

Comparative
Constitutions
Project Variable
Coding Rule
ðOriginal CCP Code in ParenthesesÞ

Statement of JI
Life Term
Selection Proc.

JUDIND
SUPTERM
SUPNOM, SUPAP

Coded 1 if JUDIND equals “yes” ð1Þ
Coded 1 if SUPTERM equals “life term with mandatory retirement at a certain age” ð88Þ or “life term” ð89Þ
Coded 1 if SUPNOM equals “judicial council/commission” ð6Þ or the “judiciary” ð7Þ; SUPNOM equals “head of
state” ð1Þ, “head of government” ð2Þ, or “the government/cabinet” ð3Þ AND SUPAP equals the “ﬁrst chamber
of the legislature” ð4Þ, the “second chamber of the legislature” ð5Þ, “judicial council/commission” ð6Þ, or the
“judiciary” ð7Þ; SUPNOM equals the “ﬁrst chamber of the legislature” ð4Þ or the “second chamber of the
legislature ð5Þ AND SUPAP equals “head of state” ð1Þ, “head of government” ð2Þ, “the government/cabinet”
ð3Þ, “judicial council/commission” ð6Þ, or the “judiciary”
Removal Proc. JREM, JREMPRO,
Coded 1 if JREM equals “no” ð2Þ; JREMPRO equals the “ﬁrst chamber of the legislature” ð4Þ AND JREMFIRP equals
JREMFIRP, JREMSECP,
3/5 majority ð3Þ, 2/3 majority ð4Þ, 3/4 majority ð5Þ, or “unspeciﬁed supermajority” ð6Þ; JREMPRO equals the “second
JREMBOTP, JREMAP
chamber of the legislature” ð5Þ AND JREMSECP equals 3/5 majority ð3Þ, 2/3 majority ð4Þ, 3/4 majority ð5Þ, or
“unspeciﬁed supermajority” ð6Þ; JREMPRO equals the “both chambers of the legislature are required” ð6Þ AND
JREMBOTP equals 3/5 majority ð3Þ, 2/3 majority ð4Þ, 3/4 majority ð5Þ, or “unspeciﬁed supermajority” ð6Þ;
JREMPRO equals “judicial council” ð8Þ or “public” ð9Þ AND JREMPRO does not equal the “ﬁrst chamber of the
legislature” ð4Þ, the “second chamber of the legislature” ð5Þ, or “both chambers of the legislature are required” ð6Þ AND
JREMAP equals “head of state” ð1Þ, “head of government” ð2Þ, “the government/cabinet” ð3Þ, the “ﬁrst chamber of the
legislature” ð4Þ, the “second chamber of the legislature” ð5Þ, “both chambers of the legislature are required ð6Þ, the “public
prosecutor” ð7Þ, or “other, please specify in the comments section” ð96Þ
Removal Cond. JREMCON
Coded 1 if JREMCON equals “crimes and other issues of conduct” ð2Þ, “treason” ð3Þ, “violations of the constitution”
ð4Þ, or “incapacitated” ð5Þ AND JREMCON does not equal “general dissatisfaction” ð1Þ or “left explicitly to nonconstitutional law” ð90Þ
Salary Insulation JUDSAL
Coded 1 if JUDSAL equals “yes” ð1Þ

De Jure
Variable

Table A1. Variables and Coding Rules Used for De Jure Variables

Appendix

Table A2. Effect of Six Aspects of De Jure Judicial Independence on De Facto Judicial Independence

De jure variable:
Selection Proc.
Removal Proc.

ð1Þ

ð2Þ

ð3Þ

ð4Þ

ð5Þ

ð6Þ

ð7Þ

ð8Þ

2.02
ð.04Þ
2.01
ð.05Þ

.02
ð.02Þ
.04
ð.03Þ

.06*
ð.02Þ
.00
ð.02Þ

.01
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.02Þ

2.01
ð.03Þ
.00
ð.02Þ
.07*
ð.02Þ
.05*
ð.02Þ

2.02
ð.02Þ
.01
ð.01Þ
.01
ð.01Þ
.01
ð.02Þ

.02
ð.04Þ
.02
ð.03Þ
.08*
ð.03Þ

.08*
ð.02Þ
2.00
ð.02Þ
.10*
ð.03Þ

.00
ð.01Þ
2.02
ð.02Þ
.02
ð.02Þ

.05
ð.04Þ
.06
ð.05Þ
.08
ð.05Þ
2.10*
ð.05Þ

2.01
ð.02Þ
.01
ð.03Þ
2.02
ð.03Þ
2.01
ð.03Þ

.00
ð.04Þ
.03
ð.11Þ
.02
ð.06Þ

All
2008
OLS

.01
ð.01Þ
.15*
ð.05Þ
.54*
ð.09Þ
.17
ð.11Þ
2.03*
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
2.02
ð.08Þ
2.05
ð.07Þ
.07*
ð.03Þ
.04
ð.02Þ
2.01*
ð.00Þ
All
2008
OLS

All
2008
OLS

.01
ð.01Þ
.14*
ð.04Þ
.55*
ð.09Þ
.18
ð.11Þ
2.03*
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
2.02
ð.07Þ
2.05
ð.06Þ
.07*
ð.03Þ
.04*
ð.02Þ
2.01*
ð.00Þ
All
2008
OLS

167

167

All
All
PA
197
7,752

.01*
ð.00Þ
.11*
ð.01Þ
.07*
ð.01Þ
.05*
ð.01Þ
2.01
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
2.01
ð.04Þ
2.08*
ð.04Þ
.08*
ð.03Þ
2.02
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
All
All
PA
197
7,752

188

167

All
All
PA
192
7,752

.01*
ð.00Þ
.11*
ð.01Þ
.07*
ð.01Þ
.05*
ð.01Þ
2.01
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
2.01
ð.04Þ
2.08*
ð.04Þ
.08*
ð.03Þ
2.01
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
All
All
PA
192
7,752

Sel. & Rem. Proc.
Life Term
Removal Cond.
Salary Insulation
Statement of JI
Covariate:
Checks
Democracy
Press Freedom
GDP ðlnÞ
Population ðlnÞ
Interstate NGOs
Christian ð%Þ
Muslim ð%Þ
Common Law
Prom. Year
Prom. Year2
Country
Year
Estimator
Number of countries
Observations

Note.—Coefﬁcient estimates from least squares ðOLSÞ and population-averaged ðPAÞ regression models with de
facto judicial independence as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constant and binary
variables indicating region are omitted.
* p < .05.
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Table A3. Effect of De Jure Judicial Independence on De Facto Judicial Independence by Regime

De jure variable:
Selection Proc.
Removal Proc.
Sel. & Rem. Proc.

ð9Þ

ð10Þ

ð11Þ

ð12Þ

ð13Þ

ð14Þ

ð15Þ

ð16Þ

.02
ð.05Þ
2.13
ð.10Þ
.02
ð.05Þ

.05
ð.04Þ
2.18*
ð.04Þ
.09*
ð.04Þ

.04*
ð.02Þ
.01
ð.01Þ
.11*
ð.03Þ

.02
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.01Þ
.07*
ð.03Þ

2.07
ð.05Þ
.03
ð.05Þ
.03
ð.09Þ

.04
ð.04Þ
.05
ð.04Þ
.03
ð.05Þ

2.03
ð.02Þ
2.02
ð.02Þ
2.01
ð.02Þ

2.03
ð.02Þ
2.03*
ð.02Þ
2.02
ð.02Þ

Auth.
2008
OLS

.06*
ð.02Þ
.53*
ð.15Þ
.07
ð.12Þ
2.01
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
.11
ð.12Þ
.08
ð.09Þ
.05
ð.04Þ
2.12
ð.12Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
Auth.
2008
OLS

Democ.
2008
OLS

.01
ð.01Þ
.68*
ð.17Þ
.71*
ð.21Þ
2.03*
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
.00
ð.10Þ
2.13
ð.09Þ
.04
ð.03Þ
.02
ð.02Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
Democ.
2008
OLS

71

71

Auth.
All
PA
137
4,125

.01
ð.00Þ
.04*
ð.01Þ
.02*
ð.01Þ
.01
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
.05
ð.03Þ
2.01
ð.03Þ
.06*
ð.03Þ
2.03
ð.02Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
Auth.
All
PA
137
4,125

96

96

Democ.
All
PA
146
3,627

.00
ð.00Þ
.07*
ð.01Þ
.09*
ð.01Þ
2.02*
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
2.07
ð.07Þ
2.15*
ð.06Þ
.12*
ð.03Þ
2.01
ð.02Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
Democ.
All
PA
146
3,627

Covariate:
Checks
Press Freedom
GDP ðlnÞ
Population ðlnÞ
Interstate NGOs
Christian ð%Þ
Muslim ð%Þ
Common Law
Prom. Year
Prom. Year2
Country
Year
Estimator
Number of countries
Observations

Note.—Coefﬁcient estimates from least squares ðOLSÞ and population-averaged ðPAÞ regression models with de
facto judicial independence as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constant and binary
variables indicating region are omitted. Auth. 5 authoritarian; democ. 5 democratic.
* p < .05.
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Table A4. Estimates from Interaction Models

Variable:
Sel. & Rem. Proc.
Checks
Sel. & Rem. Proc.  Checks
Press Freedom
GDP ðlnÞ
Population ðlnÞ
Interstate NGOs
Christian ð%Þ
Muslim ð%Þ
Common Law
Prom. Year
Prom. Year2
Sample
Estimator
Countries
Observations

ð1Þ

ð2Þ

ð3Þ

ð4Þ

.05
ð.05Þ
.04
ð.02Þ
.03
ð.04Þ
.57*
ð.16Þ
.05
ð.12Þ
2.01
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
.07
ð.11Þ
.03
ð.08Þ
.06
ð.05Þ
.00
ð.00Þ

2.05
ð.06Þ
.01
ð.01Þ
.03
ð.03Þ
.66*
ð.16Þ
.69*
ð.22Þ
2.03*
ð.01Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
.02
ð.10Þ
2.15
ð.09Þ
.05
ð.03Þ
.00
ð.00Þ

Auth.
OLS
72
72

Democ.
OLS
96
96

.05*
ð.02Þ
.01
ð.00Þ
.02
ð.02Þ
.04*
ð.01Þ
.02*
ð.01Þ
.01
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
.05
ð.03Þ
2.01
ð.03Þ
.06*
ð.03Þ
2.03
ð.02Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
Auth.
PA
137
4,125

2.01
ð.02Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
.07*
ð.01Þ
.09*
ð.01Þ
2.02*
ð.01Þ
.01*
ð.00Þ
2.08
ð.07Þ
2.15*
ð.06Þ
.11*
ð.03Þ
2.01
ð.02Þ
.00
ð.00Þ
Democ.
PA
146
3,627

Note.—Models 1 and 2 contain estimates from least squares ðOLSÞ regression models; models 3 and 4 contain
estimates from population-averaged ðPAÞ models. De facto judicial independence is the dependent variable, and robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Multiple imputation was used before estimation of models 3 and 4 to ensure that
missing data do not bias the estimates. Estimates from the imputed data sets are combined using Rubin’s rules. The constant is omitted from the table, and region ﬁxed effects are omitted from the models. Auth. 5 authoritarian; democ. 5
democratic.
* p < .05.
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